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Abstract 
It is often claimed that industrial restructuring leads to diminished roles for trade 
unionism and other forms of labour organisations by informalising employment and 
relocating production. Drawing on selected case studies from long term fieldwork in 
regions of India, this article shows that trajectories of industrial restructuring and the 
responses by organised labour over the past two decades have been diverse. It is 
argued that the diverse response not only reflects structural opportunities and 
constraints for labour to be organised in particular ways, but also different histories 
and experiences of labour association. Contrary to the presumption about the general 
demise of trade unionism and the apparent unattainability of class solidarity in 
contemporary globalised capitalism, it is observed that India‘s labour movement is 
experiencing a degree of resurgence, and new forms of labour organisations and 
activism are emerging, especially involving informal workers in the formal sector. 
That these innovative forms of mobilisation are shaped by experiences and aspirations 
that do not conform to the established institutionalised frameworks for dispute 
resolution has important policy and political implications. 
 
Keywords: class dynamics; industrial restructuring; industrial relocation; informal 
employment; trade unions; collective bargaining; India 
 
This is the Accepted Version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Taylor and Francis in Third World 
Quarterly: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctwq20#.V1a--vkrKM8  
Accepted Version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22573/  
 2 
Introduction 
This article is concerned with the diversity in patterns of industrial 
restructuring and responses by labour in India. Through the analysis of case studies 
drawn from long-term fieldwork, labour‘s response to informalisation and production 
relocation are shown to have been diverse, reflecting not only the different economic 
and political opportunities for mobilisation, but also the particular historical 
experiences of association by workers
1
. By doing so, it engages with the wider debate 
on the role of labour organisations in contemporary processes of industrial 
restructuring, and identify emerging opportunities and constrains for labour 
movements in India. 
Industrial restructuring in India is often attributed to neoliberalism and 
globalisation to varying degrees, which have compelled firms to raise productivity 
and competitiveness, by reducing costs, increasing ‗flexibility‘ and strengthening 
control over labour
2
. These changes are of course not unique to India, and share 
elements of broader changes at the global-level associated with the ‗great slowdown‘ 
of production in advanced capitalist countries since the 1970s
3
. At the same time, the 
industrial restructuring in India, which also started in the 1970s, preceding the full 
scale liberalisation, has been at least in part a response to India‘s own ‗crisis of 
accumulation‘ in the second half of the 1960s4.  
Thus industrial restructuring has been on-going in India for several decades, 
which has taken a variety of different forms, or ‗fixes‘ for recovering profitability. As 
observed globally, these include: geographical relocation of production; changes in 
the organisation of production and the labour process; shifting industrial sectors and 
products; and the extension of financing and speculative activities replacing or 
subjugating production
5
. In the case studies analysed in this article, firms have placed 
increased emphasis on practices such as the intensified use of casual and contract 
labour and relocation of production to regions where labour movements are less well 
established. It has been argued that these practices reflect capital‘s strategy to 
subordinate labour, especially by impeding the right to organise
6
. 
There has been a diversity of responses by Indian labour organisations to this 
industrial restructuring, including different forms and levels of mobilisation. Policy 
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debates and labour politics at the national level have primarily been focused on 
‗flexible‘ labour market reforms since the 1990s7. The most recent version of this 
agenda is the labour law reforms pursued by the governing Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP). This includes measures which allow greater number of firms to operate outside 
the coverage of most labour legislation, and make it more difficult for trade unions to 
be formed and recognised as representative agents.  
In response, national Central Trade Union Organisations (CTUOs) affiliated to 
a range of political parties and factions organised campaigns to challenge these labour 
law reforms at various times. India‘s organised labour movement has traditionally 
been fragmented along partisan lines since political parties attempted to formally 
organise workers in the 1940s
8
. Until recently CTUOs have struggled to coordinate 
their campaign across partisan and factional lines against on-going labour law reforms. 
The nation-wide general strike in March 2012 was the first action in recent history 
called by all major CTUOs across the political spectrum, including (at the time) the 
ruling Indian National Congress (INC)‘s affiliated labour-wing, the Indian National 
Trade Union Congress (INTUC), and the BJP‘s union organisation Bharatiya 
Mazdoor Sangh (BMS), which was followed up a two-day general strike in February 
2013. While in the September 2015 general strike, the now ruling BJP-affiliated BMS 
broke ranks with other CTUOs
9
, in the national protest against government proposals 
for labour law reforms on 10 March 2016, the BMS re-joined the action with other 
CTUOs. Significantly, these coordinated national actions since 2012 have involved 
demands for no contractualisation of permanent jobs, and equalising pay and benefits 
between contract and regular workers
10
. 
If there are signs of convergence amongst CTUOs at the national level in 
response to the on-going challenges of labour law reforms, there are uneven but 
growing indications of rising unionisation
11
 and intensifying labour unrest
12
. 
Reflecting the continuing trend of informalisation in recent decades, increasing 
attempts to organise informally employed workers have been documented, including 
in regions and sectors where unionisation has been traditionally limited
13
. Much of the 
well-publicised and intense moments of labour unrest have involved increasingly 
diverse forms of labour organisations, which are not connected to established 
CTUOs
14
.  
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This article contributes to this emerging literature by analysing the observed 
diversity in the trajectory of industrial restructuring and patterns of labour 
organisation through four case studies. In doing so, it draws attention to the 
divergence in forms of labour organisations and struggles at different sites of 
production, which are not always in concert with the labour politics at the national-
level. Put differently, the article argues that emerging patterns of labour unrest are an 
integral aspect of the ongoing pattern of development in India, which have their roots 
in workers‘ experiences and aspirations cultivated outside established institutional 
frameworks for dispute resolutions.  
This study also builds on ongoing debates on the role of the organised labour 
movement in contemporary global capitalist development
15
. In general, labour 
movements and unrest are observed to have followed where capital has attempted to 
recover profitability through various ‗fixes‘, including by relocation of production16, 
but this pattern has not been automatic or uniform. This article shows that, in India, in 
some cases labour organisations in the ‗old‘ sites linked their struggles with those in 
the relocated regions, while in others labour movements remained within agreed 
institutional frameworks in the region or the sector, limiting the emergence of 
alternative forms of labour organisation. As has been frequently observed, in sectors 
and regions with unfavourable structural conditions, trade unions‘ ability to link their 
plant-level struggles to broader solidarity movements, both regionally and 
internationally, is critical for the effectiveness of their mobilisation 
17
. Unions‘ 
capacity to do so is shown to be founded not only on the particular opportunities and 
compulsion for mobilisation, but also on workers‘ specific experience of association18. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 sets the context for 
the remainder of the paper by discussing forms of industrial restructuring and their 
impact on labour movements and organisations observed in selected case studies 
drawn from the field research. Section 2 is divided into three sub-sections, and 
discusses the diverse responses by labour to industrial restructuring in face of 
different forms of industrial restructuring in their particular regional and sectoral 
contexts. Section 3 concludes by drawing political and policy implications. 
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1. Contexts for industrial restructuring and labour 
organising in India 
The fieldwork on which this paper is based took place in 2001 and 2013-14, 
focusing on manufacturing factories in the organised sector. Worker‘s status in India 
is categorised across two dimensions. On the one hand, the site of employment is 
distinguished between organised and unorganised sectors depending on the size of 
employment (10 workers is the threshold for units with electricity; 20 without 
electricity)
19
. On the other hand, workers are also categorised to be either formally or 
informally employed depending on whether the employer provides employment and 
social security benefits. In the 2011-12 National Sample Survey (NSS), it is estimated 
that of the 483.7 million Indian workforce, 91.9 percent were informal workers. Of 
course, the two dimensions tend to overlap: of those employed in the unorganised 
sector, 99.6 percent were categorised as informal workers
20
.  
Informalisation has been a structural characteristic of India‘s labour market 
since early industrialisation in the mid-nineteenth century under British colonial rule
21
. 
In recent decades, informalisation has proceeded not only through the expansion of 
the unorganised sector, but also increasingly by the informalisation of employment 
practices within the organised sector 
22
. In the 1999-2000 NSS data, 62.2 percent of 
those employed in organised sector units were categorised as formal workers. In 
2011-12, this figure fell to 45.4 percent, indicating that the majority of those 
employed even in the organised sector is now estimated to be working without 
employment and social security benefits. The period of this research has coincided 
with the increased use of subcontracting and casual employment in formal/ organised 
sector firms, which as noted above, are associated with the on-going industrial 
restructuring since the 1970s.  
Along with the informalisation of employment, another important 
consequence of industrial restructuring and a backdrop to the present field research 
has been the relocation of production away from traditional industrial centres, such as 
Kolkata (Calcutta) in West Bengal and Mumbai (Bombay) in Maharashtra. Newer 
industrial centres have emerged in various parts of India over the past several decades, 
some of which have been in smaller cities and towns adjoining larger metropolises, as 
well as in rural areas in the same States. Some industrial production has also shifted to 
This is the Accepted Version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Taylor and Francis in Third World 
Quarterly: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctwq20#.V1a--vkrKM8  
Accepted Version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22573/  
 6 
regions with a less established history of industrial development and organised labour, 
including Gujarat and the National Capital Region (NCR)
23
. This shifting pattern in 
India‘s industrial location has been further reinforced by the decline in the labour 
migration in-flows to traditional major industrial centres and cities such as Kolkata 
and Mumbai in favour of the above mentioned newer sites in recent years
24
.  
[Figure 1] 
This industrial relocation – or ‗spatial fix‘ – is reflected in the evolution of the 
present research, mapped in Figure 1. In 2001, fieldwork was carried out in a total of 
20 mills and factories in a wide variety of industrial activities, ranging from jute and 
cotton textiles to light engineering and pharmaceuticals, all based in two cities, 
Kolkata and Mumbai. In the recent round of fieldwork in 2013-14, many of the units 
surveyed in 2001 either terminated or relocated production to other sites
25
. In all cases 
where production was relocated, the destination was to regions with a limited history 
of organised labour and where the enforcement of labour law has been lax. Follow-up 
research has been carried out at new units where production was relocated, which 
meant that subsequently the fieldwork extended beyond the original two cities to 
include other regions such as Pune and rural areas in the Buldhana District within 
Maharashtra; its neighbouring State of Gujarat and Union Territory of Dadra and 
Nagar Haveli; the National Capital Region (NCR) in north India; and further north in 
Chandigarh intersecting Himachal Pradesh and Uttarkhand.  
[Table 1] 
Rather than analysing all cases studied during the two rounds of fieldwork
26
, 
this article focuses on four selected cases representing different ways in which labour 
has responded to industrial restructuring, as outlined in Table 1. In all four cases, 
informalisation of employment by increased use of casual and contract labour, as well 
as intensification of the labour process were observed. All cases involved some 
degree of relocation of production to or within newer industrial areas with less 
established histories of labour movements, and two of these involved the closure of 
the original plants. These features correspond to some aspects of the so-called ‗low 
road‘ of industrial restructuring, where improvements in productivity and 
competitiveness are achieved primarily through an enhancement of ‗numerical 
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flexibility‘, lowering labour costs and the intensification of work27. However, some of 
the cases also involved technological change in the production process as well as in 
the products manufactured, with degrees of ‗flexible specialisation‘, which are 
features of ‗high road‘ strategies in restructuring 28 . Therefore, although 
informalisation of employment and relocation of production feature in these case 
studies, they do not represent a simplistic perpetuation of the ‗race to the bottom‘ 
thesis
29
. This is because although the cases selected belong to the so-called ‗high end‘ 
sectors, they manufacture standard products with standardised production processes 
where profit margins are small
30
. 
Both informalisation of employment and relocation of production have had 
significant implications for labour organisations and movements. India‘s Trade Union 
Act of 1926 applies to organised sector units, and in theory, workers are entitled to 
form or join a trade union regardless of whether they are formally or informally 
employed. In practice, unionisation of informal workers has faced challenges in India, 
sometimes due to legal interpretations of the employer-employee relation
31
, but more 
generally due to employers‘ refusal to recognise informal workers as a representative 
agent for collective bargaining. The latter is compounded by the Trade Union Act not 
stipulating the compulsory recognition of representative unions by employers or 
procedures for such recognition. The Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, which provides 
legal procedures for dispute resolution, also only applies to the organised sector, and 
typically to permanent or regular employees. Therefore, informalisation of 
employment in the form of subcontacting and casualisation not only potentially 
erodes the organisational base for trade unions, but also limits the legal and 
institutional recourse available during industrial disputes. 
The lack of national-level legal stipulation for employers to recognise 
representative unions has led to diverse developments in labour organisations across 
regions in India. This is partly because trade unions and industrial disputes are on the 
‗concurrent‘ list, which allows state governments to amend central government Acts 
or issue separate legislation, and also because the legislation are enforced at the state-
level. The regional diversity is important because different institutional frameworks 
for labour bargaining can impact on the ‗tightness‘ of the labour markets, and thus 
affect workers‘ ‗marketplace structural power‘ 32 . It also has implications for 
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opportunities and constraints for labour to respond differently to industrial 
restructuring, as well for workers‘ capacity and experience in various forms of labour 
associations. 
Of the industrial units studied in the present research, many in Kolkata have 
had multiple representative unions recognised in a single workplace, typically 
affiliated to different political parties and factions
33
. The most dominant of these 
party-affiliated union organisations in West Bengal, where Kolkata is located, is the 
Centre for Trade Unions (CITU), the trade union wing of the Communist Party of 
India-Marxist (CPM), which governed the state between 1977 and 2011. In 2011, a 
coalition led by the All India Trinamool Congress was elected to power, but at the 
time of the fieldwork in 2013-14, the CITU-affiliated unions continued to be 
influential in many workplaces. Interestingly, despite being critical to the CPM-CITU 
nexus, there are indications that the All India Trinamool Congress is cultivating a 
similar institutional network for the organised labour mobilisation under its own 
labour arm, the Indian National Trinamool Trade Union Congress (INTTUC). It does 
this, either by setting up a rival affiliated union or replacing the existing CITU-
affiliated leadership in the workplace studied
34
. The continued dominance of party-
affiliated unionism in Kolkata so far is an indication that organised labour continues 
to retain some degree of importance for political parties in the region. 
By contrast, Mumbai‘s Maharashtra has been led by a combination of the 
Indian National Congress (INC) and the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) – the NCP 
split from the INC in 1999 – for much of the period since independence until 2014, 
when the coalition led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) formed the government. In 
sectors such as textiles, the INC has imposed the union affiliated to its labour-wing, 
the INTUC, as the sole representative union based on the provision of the Bombay 
Industrial Disputes Act of 1946. However, in general, the INC took steps to 
‗demobilise‘ the labour movement following independence, containing communist 
trade unions and restraining labour militancy
35
. The subsequent rise of communal-
based redistributive politics
36
 has further diminished the political influence of party-
affiliated trade unions in Mumbai. Significantly, Congress-affiliated unions, as well as 
the Shiv Sena‘s labour wing Bharatiya Kamgar Sena (BKS) and today‘s governing 
BJP‘s the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS), have traditionally sided with the 
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government and employers, and often attempted to undermine labour struggles by 
others, particularly those by leftist unions.  
The ineffectiveness of party-affiliated unionism has opened space for diverse 
forms of independent unionism in Mumbai
37
, ranging from non-party affiliated 
federations to company unionism, as well as involvement of civil society 
organisations representing workers‘ causes. In general, forms of labour organisation 
have been more diverse in Mumbai compared to Kolkata, and as a result, labour 
disputes have been less prone to institutional mediation by political parties and the 
state. While state-mediated frameworks for dispute resolution are sometimes favoured 
on the grounds that they are associated with ‗restrained‘ labour militancy and 
industrial peace
38
, it is also observed that conciliated settlements tend not to be in 
favour of workers
39
. It is argued in section 2 that the contrasting historical unfolding 
and experience of association in the two cities contributed to different patterns and 
trajectories of labour responses in the case study factories. 
In each of the cases studied, industrial relocation or ‗spatial fixes‘ were always 
accompanied by other forms of ‗fix‘, such as transformation of the labour process, 
changes to the product, and the extension of financial activities, all of which have 
implications for the shifting boundaries of employment status and labour‘s ‗structural‘ 
as well as ‗associational power‘ to organise 40 . For example, outsourcing and 
subcontracting can undermine the strategic location of a workforce in the production 
process, and also reduce the capacity for workers in different segments to coordinate 
their struggles
41
, as shown in the case of the electronic fan manufacturing in section 
2.1. Relocation of production to regions with greater unemployment and under-
employment reduces workers‘ bargaining power in the labour market in general. It 
may also undermine workers‘ capacity for association, especially when production is 
relocated to areas with a limited history of unionisation, as in the two cases discussed 
in section 2.2.  
One of the ways in which labour can respond to the relocation of production is 
by coordinating struggles across geographical locations
42
. In the cases analysed below, 
two types of extra-plant institutions can be identified. The first is the traditional state-
mediated collective bargaining framework typically set up at the industry-level. This 
type of tripartite labour institution continues to provide the platform for wage 
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settlements in the textile industry. In the case of the electronic fan factory in Kolkata 
discussed in section 2.1, although the collective bargaining has decentralised to the 
plant-level, wages are still calculated using the pay-scale agreed under a tripartite 
settlement last negotiated in 1997. The second type of extra-unit institution is the 
union federation or network organised as an association of workers
43
. This means that 
independent union organisations unaffiliated to political parties can be organised at 
workplace-levels, but also they can form federations linking these plant unions. 
Indeed, a company-wide union federation at the soap and detergent corporation 
played an instrumental role in linking struggles at various sites. This is contrasted in 
section 2.2 with another case of relocation of production at a company manufacturing 
luminary products, where an extra-plant company union federation collapsed, 
weakening the capacity for workers to form a union at the relocated production site.  
The diverse responses by labour to industrial restructuring reflects the range of 
opportunities and compulsions for workers to organise, which are shaped by the 
articulation of a range of factors, such as labour law, the nature of labour politics, and 
the ways in which changes in employment practices and the relocation of production 
affect the ‗structural power‘ of workers. Crucially, the diversity of labour‘s responses 
also reflect particular histories of labour organisation and worker experiences of 
association. The final case discussed in section 2.3, the automobile assembly plant in 
the NCR, contrasts with the other three cases (see Table 1) in that the production site 
was set up in a newer industrial area, hiring migrant workers with limited connections 
to the region, but also limited experience in conventional forms of labour organisation. 
It is argued that the intense struggle and the particular form of unionisation pursued at 
this unit reflect the different aspirations of workers, as well as the limited and weaker 
experiences in institutionalised forms of labour protest in the region. 
2. Diverse dynamics of industrial restructuring and 
labour organising in India 
This section is divided into three sub-sections, analysing four cases of 
industrial restructuring and labour movements drawn from the field research. Section 
2.1 focuses on an electronic fan manufacturing plant based in Kolkata, where the 
response by organised labour has been limited despite significant changes to the 
product, production organisation and labour process. This is contrasted with cases 
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from Mumbai-based luminary and soap and detergent firms in section 2.2 in which 
union federations and extra-plant solidarity movements played an important role in 
determining unions‘ capacity to link struggles. Finally, section 2.3 examines a case of 
auto assembly that emphasises the challenges associated with unionisation in newer 
industrial regions with less established institutional frameworks for labour 
organisations. 
2.1 Industrial restructuring and organisation of labour in 
Kolkata: the case of electronic fan manufacturing 
One of the production sites surveyed in Kolkata is a leading manufacturer of 
electronic fans and has been operating since the 1950s. Until the early-1990s most 
manufacturing and assembly processes were carried out in-house at the plant, but over 
the past thirty years all manufacturing and a number of assembly tasks have been 
shifted to outside vendors, leaving only part of assembly, quality inspections and final 
packaging on site. The company has another plant in the NCR in north India, which 
retains some of the manufacturing and assembly processes. The NCR plant is reported 
to employ primarily migrant workers who are not unionised, and who the company 
management alleges are more willing to accept ‗flexible‘ working schedules 
according to the seasonality of demand in the product. 
This change in production organisation accompanied a significant shift in 
workforce composition at the Kolkata plant. In 2001, when the plant was initially 
surveyed, it was reported that the majority of 357 workers employed had permanent 
contracts. By 2013, only 79 workers had permanent status on the payroll but the 
company had 487 contract workers organised by 14 contractors working on site. 
Some of the contract workers were hired to carry out tasks such as catering and 
cleaning, but most of them were working on the assembly line, sometimes alongside 
permanent workers. Some contractor groups had exclusive responsibility forcertain 
tasks, including one that specialises in the assembly of motors, a core task in the 
manufacturing of electronic fans. Workers from this latter contractor are said to 
assemble one motor every 12 seconds, or about 300 motors per hour per person, 
which the company management alleges is 30 per cent more than can be achieved by 
workers in other groups, including permanent workers. 
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These changes in production organisation coincided with the rising demand 
for electronic fans and technological change in the material used, with plastic 
replacing some of the metal parts. As the plant did not have facilities to manufacture 
these plastic parts, the company started to outsource production fromthe early-1990s. 
The shift to plastic enabled fans to be made lighter and designed in greater accordance 
with consumer preference. Furthermore, the reduction in the reliance on the 
permanent workforce allowed the company to gain greater control over the production 
costs, by smoothing the cost of parts and components procurement as well as lowering 
labour costs. However, despite the increased use of outsourcing and contractors, the 
management in the Kolkata plant expressed an inability to adjust the workforce in 
response to seasonal variation in demand compared to the NCR plant. 
Despite the significant change in the labour process as a result of the ‗spatial‘, 
‗technological‘ and ‗product‘ fixes, explicit labour unrest or resistance have been 
limited at this plant in Kolkata. Since the initial fieldwork in 2001, there have been 
three unions active at this site: one affiliated to the CPI-M‘s CITU, one belonging to a 
State-level faction of the INC, and another independent union without formal 
affiliation to political parties, although the leadership was linked to the BJP. At the 
time of the 2013 fieldwork, a fourth INTTUC-affiliated union was set up, reportedly 
becoming the preferred union of the company management after the rise to power of 
the All India Trinamool Congress in West Bengal. All four of these recognised unions 
only represented permanent workers, collectively negotiating pay settlements every 
three years. However, at the time of the research, there was an attempt by some 
contract workers to form a separate union, which was resisted by the company and 
apparently unsupported by the existing unions. 
This represents a case in which, despite significant industrial restructuring, 
changes to the organisation of labour and overt labour unrest have been limited. It is 
possible, however, that subtler forms of struggle take place in collective bargaining. 
Although wages are indexed to the pay scale negotiated at industry-level in 1997, it is 
likely that unionised workers gain a greater degree of employment security and 
various fringe benefits, such as paid leave during festival period. The management‘s 
complaint about ‗inflexible‘ labour in the Kolkata plant compared to the newer NCR 
site also hints that unionised labour in Kolkata is not without bargaining power.  
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But these gains are negotiated and allowed, in so far as workers operate within 
the institutional framework set by the company, trade unions, and political parties. 
Political parties use their affiliated unions not only to mobilise votes and organise 
rallies, but also as a means of ‗restraining‘ labour militancy and maintaining a 
conducive environment for accumulation
44
. Indeed, contrary to the popular perception 
of party-affiliated unionism being a hindrance to attracting investment in West Bengal, 
factory managers interviewed in the present research often expressed their preference 
for a unionised workforce that can be ‗disciplined‘ with the help of political parties or 
the state. In a broader historical perspective, state accommodation of organised labour 
in West Bengal might also be in response to class struggle in a context in which class-
based political mobilisation has relatively greater political influence. Nevertheless, in 
relation to the present discussion, the dominance of party-affiliated unionism appears 
to have offered limited opportunities and incentives for, as well as capacities of 
workers to respond to the on-going industrial restructuring through alternative forms 
of labour organisations. Unions independent of political parties and organisations 
external to the firm have been less prominent in Kolkata compared to other regions in 
cases studied for this research (particularly Mumbai). It is also significant that the 
unionisation of the non-permanent workforce has been limited both in its attempt and 
in any success, in contrast to the cases discussed below.   
2.2 Industrial restructuring and the role of union federations: 
a comparison of two Mumbai-based firms 
The case of luminaries manufacturing 
As part of the initial research design, several firms were selected for operating 
similar production in Kolkata and Mumbai in 2001
45
. One of these was a 
multinational electronics company producing light bulbs and luminary products in the 
two cities with similar production organisation and technology. While 144 workers, 
most of whom were permanent, at the Kolkata plant were organised by a CITU 
affiliated union, 245 again mostly permanent workers at the corresponding unit in 
Mumbai were represented by a plant-based company union unaffiliated to political 
parties. The latter union at the Mumbai‘s production unit was formed in the late 1960s, 
which subsequently linked with unions in other units of the company to form an 
India-wide enterprise union federation in 1971. The role of the union federation at this 
electronics company was to demand equalisation of bonus payments and pension 
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schemes for workers across different establishments in India. Although the company 
was unwilling to negotiate with the union federation at the beginning, preferring to 
negotiate different settlements at each unit, it finally gave recognition in 1979.  
By the mid-1980s the union federation was becoming ineffective, collapsing 
in 1986. This was alleged to have been a result of an emerging conflict of interest 
between units. In 1982 the head office union in Mumbai refused to sign the settlement 
negotiated by the federation demanding a higher bonus for their staff. In a subsequent 
case, divisions emerged between units over the company‘s attempt to introduce 
computers in offices, eventually exposing the inability of the federation to control 
plant-level union bodies. However, the company management also actively sought to 
instigate the split within the union movement, by encouraging supervisors to join a 
management-sponsored staff union set up in all units around 1985-86.  
Union activists claim that the attempt to undermine the India-wide union 
federation was part of the wider company strategy, which was formed around the 
same period, to reorganise offices and production facilities away from the traditional 
industrial centres to regions with less established organised labour. A company 
executive, in an interview, argued that political conditions in Kolkata and Mumbai 
‗that give workers what they want‘, and which ‗keep employees in comfort zone and 
give rise to complacent employment relations‘ were the reason to close these units 
and shift production to regions with a ‗higher level of efficiency‘. The company 
eventually closed both the Kolkata and Mumbai units in the mid-2000s, setting up two 
new plants, one in a rural area in the outskirts of Vadodara in Gujarat and another in a 
remote part of Chandigarh in north India. The company decided that the latter plant 
would specialise in manufacturing energy-efficient light bulbs and lamps, which 
involves use of more up-to-date machinery and technology, with the conventional 
light bulb and lamp production to be consolidated in Gujarat. The production at the 
Vadodara unit started with machinery taken from the closed plants, with some 
workers also being brought to the new facility to train the workers.  
According to union activists, there was an initial attempt by a regional 
independent union to organise workers at the Vadodara plant, but the company 
refused to recognise the union, partly due to its association with the union at the 
company previously active at the same site. Around ten workers who were considered 
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to have had links with the union lost their jobs and other union activists were forced to 
go underground. Until 2012, no recognised unions were present at the plant, but when 
issues that needed settling arose, the management instigated a ‗workers‘ committee‘, 
which union activists allege was ‗pseudo-management doing the task of the company‘ 
even though it was run by workers. After several attempts to set up unions at the plant, 
in 2012 the management recognised an independent plant-based union entirely of 
rank-and-file workers, with no links to external organisations. A company executive 
admitted in an interview that management demanded the union at Vadodara to have 
no contacts with those involved in the previous union federation at the closed plants. 
It is particularly significant that the relocation to Gujarat did not result in a non-
unionised ‗flexible‘ labour regime, as popularly assumed. The leadership of this new 
internal union is based on the previous ‗workers‘ committee‘ at the plant, prompting 
activists external to the company to criticise it as a ‗management‘s union‘, although 
the union leaders themselves are keen to disassociate themselves from this image.  
The case of soap and detergent manufacturing 
Contrast this with another case of industrial relocation from Mumbai, which 
took place at the oldest plant of a multinational consumer goods company dating back 
to the 1930s, manufacturing soaps, detergents, chemicals and personal care products. 
In 2001, around 2,000 workers were represented by an independent company union. 
Similarly to previous cases, the company formulated a strategy to close down 
facilities in traditional industrial centres and to shift production to remote areas with 
less established labour institutions. The Mumbai plant eventually closed down in the 
mid-2000s, but as early as 1988 soap manufacturing started to shift to Khamgaon, 
located in north east Maharashtra, and detergent production shifted in 1998 to Dadra 
and Nagar Haveli, a central-government controlled Union Territory bordering 
Maharashtra and Gujarat. Manufacturing of personal products shifted to Chandigarh 
in north India after the closure of the Mumbai site.  
As with the case of the luminaries company, the Mumbai union at the soap 
and detergent company also linked up with unions at other plants of the company to 
form an all-India enterprise union federation. However, unlike in the former case, the 
federation did not act as a bargaining body for settlements, with the company 
continuing to hold separate agreements in each plant, and in the case of the Mumbai 
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plant even negotiating separate deals with soap and detergent departments. The 
federation acted more as a platform to build solidarity and resources for unions under 
the company, and continues to actively engage in extra-unit issues. Both the 
Khamgaon and the Dadra and Nagar Haveli plants have internal unions with links to 
the company‘s union federation, although the Khamgaon union is also affiliated to the 
BJP‘s union organisation BMS, while the Dadra and Nagar Haveli union is linked to 
the CPM‘s CITU. Thus, the company union federation was instrumental in 
maintaining solidarity amongst plant-level unions located across different regions, 
engaged in different products and production processes, and with different affiliations. 
The federation has also been successful in linking local-level struggles over various 
issues, including outsourcing and subcontracting, workplace safety, and further 
relocation of production. Despite their attempts to bring contract workers into their 
organisation, none of the unions have formally represented contract workers. 
However, the federation has campaigned for regular and contract workers to be 
treated equally in terms of pay and working conditions. 
At the same time, in all cases observed in this research, the process of 
industrial relocation has been associated with attempts to weaken workers‘ 
associational power and gain greater control over the organisation of work. In the 
example of the consumer goods firm, management continued in its attempt to 
undermine union leadership with links to the federation. In 2003, management at the 
Dadra and Nagar Haveli site brought in a rival union, affiliated to the external 
industry-wide Association of Chemical Workers Union (ACW), and despite the 
internal federation-affiliated union claiming to have majority support, negotiated a 
settlement with this ‗yellow‘ union. The internal union filed a case with the State-
level Court, but the company continued to recognise only the ACW-linked union 
leaders and negotiated another settlement with them in 2007 when disputes occurred 
over the shifting of production between plants within the area. This situation 
continued until 2010, when the ACW finally walked away from the plant, and in the 
2012 settlement the federation-linked union acted as the representative of workers. 
However, at the time of the study in 2014, the fractious relation between the 
management and the internal union was continuing, with the unit secretary dismissed 
the previous year.  
This is the Accepted Version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Taylor and Francis in Third World 
Quarterly: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctwq20#.V1a--vkrKM8  
Accepted Version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22573/  
 17 
In an even starker case, after several years of legal disputes over safety 
measures at the plant, the entire union leadership at the Khamgaon site linked to the 
federation was removed by the management in 2013, forcing workers to sign 
documents declaring allegiance to the new company-approved leadership. At the time 
of the 2013-14 fieldwork, ejected leaders were still legally challenging the company‘s 
conduct and the legitimacy of the installed union leaders, supported by donations 
from workers at the unit and the wider union federation.  
The intensity with which the company management has attempted to 
undermine the federation-affiliated plant-level unions indicates the extent to which 
their ‗associational power‘ is enhanced by the extra-plant solidarity. The company 
union federation has developed in recent years beyond linking organised labour 
within this multinational soap and detergent company, and started to cultivate access 
to international organisations and diplomatic communities. For example, when the 
negotiations over the voluntary retirement scheme (VRS) of the closed Mumbai plant 
stalled, the union federation sent a letter to the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) documenting the company‘s unwillingness to 
follow up on the compensation agreed before the plant closure. As the company‘s 
headquarters are in an OECD country, its High Commission in Mumbai was called in 
to mediate the negotiation and avoid further negative publicity. The union federation 
has since been utilising similar tactics in contesting the company‘s union busting 
policies and inchallenging its workplace safety records. The union federation‘s link to 
global solidarity movements has further been strengthened by retrenched leaders of 
the closed Mumbai plant recently taking up roles as the Indian representative of one 
the largest global union federations, which has given them another channel to link 
labour struggles beyond the company. For example, the federation succeeded in 
regularising sections of contract workers in one of the affiliated units in north India. 
The case of the soap and detergent company, where the federation was 
retained as a loose umbrella organisation of plant-level unions, including at the 
relocated sites, contrasts with that of the luminary product firm, where its India-wide 
union federation collapsed. The company management at the latter was successful in 
resisting unionisation in the relocated plant in Vadodara for nine years, and only 
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allowed it under the condition that those previously involved in the union federation 
would not interfere. 
The production process represented in these two cases involves final 
‗downstream‘ stages of standardised consumer goods manufacture, and therefore the 
difference in workers‘ structural ‗workplace bargaining power‘ accrued from their 
strategic location is unlikely to be significant. Also, the regions where production has 
been relocated in both cases are newer industrial areas with an abundant labour supply, 
either from the surrounding rural areas or in-migration from other States, and 
therefore the difference in ‗marketplace bargaining power‘ may also limited. What 
distinguishes these two cases is the different history and experience of extra-plant 
union federations, which link workplace struggles at different sites and allow for 
solidarity to be developed, enabling the cultivation of ‗associational power‘. The final 
case study further highlights the importance of the historical experience of association, 
as well as the issue of contract labour, to which we now turn. 
2.3 Organising labour in a newer industrial area: the case of 
an automobile assembly plant 
The national capital region (NCR) in the suburbs of Delhi has been the site for 
some of the most intense labour unrest in India over the past decade
46
. One of the 
units surveyed in the present research is a multinational automobile company, which 
set up its first plant in the mid-1980s in Gurgaon, at which a union initially affiliated 
to the ruling INC‘s INTUC represented permanent workers. The labour unrest in 2000 
at the old Gurgaon plant saw the State government intervene. The entire union 
leadership was subsequently dismissed, replaced by a new leader who delinked its 
party-affiliation. In 2006, the company set up its second plant in Manesar also in the 
NCR, only 30 kilometres from the first Gurgaon site. At the time of the 2013-14 
fieldwork, there were 1,054 permanent workers and around 2,600 regularly employed 
contract workers at the new Manesar plant.  
In 2011, dissatisfied with the intensity of work and levels of pay and benefits, 
workers at the new Manesar plant started to mobilise to form their own union. The 
company initially suppressed this move citing fear of union affiliation to political 
parties. Instead of setting up their own union, the company insisted that they join the 
existing independent union at the old Gurgaon plant, which the workers refused. 
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During a 10 month dispute, the company used various means of intimidation, 
including terminating the contracts of workers demanding unionisation, undeclared 
lockouts, deployment of police and company-hired ‗goons‘, and threat of torture and 
imprisonment. Workers responded with several phases of wildcat strikes and sit-down 
protests
47
. In March 2012, a new independent union based in Manesar was registered 
with the State government. However, later in 2012, an incident occurred which led to 
the murder of a human resource manager and the injury of several others. While the 
new union leadership pointed to suspicious circumstances which indicate collusion 
between the company management and the police, 147 workers were arrested, 
followed by a suspension of 546 permanent workers and 1,800 contract workers. The 
union‘s activity shifted to supporting the suspended and arrested workers, which 
attracted international solidarity. This led to a formation of an international delegation 
of lawyers, trade unions and human rights groups to investigate the incident, which 
included a trade union leader from the parent automobile company
48
. In 2014 the first 
union election was held at the Manesar plant after the incident, in which the previous 
leadership held on to their posts, and the arrested workers received bail in 2015. The 
union continues to lead the campaign to reinstate the dismissed workers as well as for 
equalisation of pay between permanent and contract workers. 
As with the two cases discussed in section 2.2, auto production in NCR 
represents another example of eventual unionisation in a newer industrial area with 
less established labour movements. This case is particularly significant in that the 
process of unionisation was based on rank-and-file mobilisation, as opposed to 
leadership approved by the company management as in the luminary plant. It is also 
important to note that, although the newly formed union in the Manesar plant is 
officially based on members who are permanent workers, a key demand of the union 
from its outset was for all contract workers to be regularised and to receive the same 
pay and benefits. Even though this demand has not been fulfilled, and the company 
has further outsourced and subcontracted production processes since the formation of 
the union, the solidarity formed between regular and contract workers has been an 
important basis of its mobilisation, and contrasts with the Kolkata electronic fan plant 
in section 2.1. 
This is the Accepted Version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Taylor and Francis in Third World 
Quarterly: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctwq20#.V1a--vkrKM8  
Accepted Version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22573/  
 20 
The automobile industry is seen as one of the sectors where vertical linkages 
offer structural ‗workplace bargaining power‘ due to workers‘ capacity to disrupt 
production
49
. A certain degree of education and skill training are required, which 
might also offer ‗marketplace bargaining power‘, but the ease with which the 
company has responded to strikes and protests by bringing in replacement workforce 
indicates that this may be limited.  
Another important aspect of this case is the experience of labour struggle and 
association. Like other cases analysed in this article, the NCR plants have seen 
increasing informalisation of employment and intensification of the labour process, 
which has included extension of the working day throughunpaid overtime and the 
cutting of meals and bathroom breaks. The imposed wage structure carries a greater 
component of ‗performance-based‘ pay, which union activists claim are discretionary 
and often withdrawn for subjective reasons. Significantly, these processes have taken 
place in the context in which institutional frameworks for labour protests and dispute 
resolutions have been less established. Over the past decade growing labour unrest 
has been reported in the region, not only in the automobile sector, but also in other 
industries
50
. Unions in the NCR have established a coordinating committee to link 
these plant-level struggles and cultivate solidarity amongst them. The incident at the 
Manesar plant discussed above has also inspired solidarity actions not only within the 
NCR, but across India and beyond, as indicated by the formation of the international 
delegation. 
An added element to this experience of labour association is the background of 
the workers at Manesar. Workers at the Manesar plant, and indeed the union 
leadership, are younger compared to those in other regions, mostly in their 20s and 
early 30s, and are better educated. Indeed, Manear workers refused to join the existing 
union at the Gurgaon plant, not only because of their suspicion that the union 
leadership is too close to the company management, but also because of the 
perception that the Gurgaon workers are more ‗mature‘51. It is also reported that, 
while 60 to 70 percent of the workforce were drawn from neighbouring rural areas in 
2011-12, by the time of the fieldwork in 2013-14, about 60 percent were migrants 
from a wide range of regions, including Orissa, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar 
Pradesh and Bihar
52
. That the workers and union leaders came into labour 
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associations with different experience and aspirations, and that their recourse to 
established institutional frameworks of dispute resolution was limited significantly 
shaped the particular trajectory of labour‘s response in this case. 
3. Concluding discussion 
Contrary to the general perception that industrial restructuring leads to a 
diminished role for the organisation of labour, this article demonstrates the diverse 
ways in which labour has responded to industrial restructuring and various ‗fixes‘ 
attempted by capital. These selected cases obviously do not diminish the challenge 
faced by the labour movement in India where the vast majority of its workforce is not 
unionised
53
. But the recent increase in labour unrest, certainly in its intensity, if not in 
frequency
54
, as well as the possible resurgence of unionisation observed by macro-
level indicators
55
 are consistent with the findings of this study. The case studies 
discussed also suggest the possible opening of spaces for new forms of labour 
organisation and activism are emerging. 
The case studies show that labour‘s responses have differed partly due to 
economic and political opportunities and compulsions for labour to be organised in 
specific ways. The case of the electronic fan manufacturer in Kolkata discussed in 
section 2.1 suggested that incumbent workers may have secured some gains in the 
form of employment security and fringe benefits. But the case  also indicates that the 
dominance of party-affiliated trade unions may have limited the scope for alternative 
forms of mobilisation and ensured that unrest remained within the ‗accepted‘ 
institutional framework, which limited the ability of recognised unions to support the 
formation of nascent contract worker unions.  
In contrast, emerging patterns of labour unrest represented in sections 2.2 and 
2.3 show that opportunities for workers to organise and mobilise on their own terms 
tend to be associated with their capacity to link plant-level struggles to extra-plant 
movements. Unions‘ capacity to do so partly reflected workers‘ ‗structural‘ 
bargaining power accrued from the labour market conditions and their strategic 
location in the production process. But another element that shaped the diverse 
trajectories and patterns of labour organisation was the history and workers‘ 
experience of different forms of association. The experience of work intensification 
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and repression in isolated workplaces are brought together by dynamic and innovative 
modes of labour struggle, typically outside established institutional frameworks for 
dispute resolutions
56
. 
The policy and political implications of this research is that the significant 
diversity in forms and intensity of labour movements and unrest is a reflection as well 
as an integral part of the ongoing processes of development and transformation in the 
Indian economy. Significantly, labour unrest such as those discussed in section 2.3 
also have an impact on employers and policy makers. During the 2013-14 fieldwork, 
many company managers expressed concerns about the emerging patterns of labour 
unrest by ‗younger workers‘. A manager of a major company in Mumbai admitted 
that this was a consequence of Indian managers taking ‗less care of unions and lost 
contact with workers‘. A manager at another major company described some of the 
high profile labour unrest in the NCR as a ‗turning point‘ and identified the contract 
labour issue as ‗something for society to take care of‘. In 2013, the now-disbanded 
Planning Commission of the central government organised a panel of major 
corporations, employer associations, CTUOs as well as other union federations to 
negotiate ‗guidelines‘ and ‗norms‘ for employing contract labour 57 , although the 
initiative appears to have ended with the BJP replacing INC at the May 2014 election. 
Yet, the BJP, in its election manifesto, declared labour as the ‗pillar of our growth‘, 
and suggested labour law reforms as one of the means to promote a ‗harmonious 
relationship between labour and the industry‘ and to encourage employers and 
employees to embrace the concept of ‗industry family‘58. In concert, elements of 
Indian capital, at least those represented in the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), 
started to promote a ‗business-labour partnership‘ and ‗to create the conducive 
environment to facilitate harmonious relationship‘59. Only time and social struggle 
will tell whether these claims by the BJP and the CII are simply hollow populist 
rhetoric or reflect a changing balance of social forces.  
Attempts by the established CTUOs, corporations and policy makers to 
negotiate an institutional framework that furnishes a stable condition for further 
intensified use of casual and contract labour, as implied in the on-going debates on 
labour law reforms are unlikely to satisfy the aspirations of a new generation of labour 
activists who have been shaping the emerging modes of labour struggles. The isolated 
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case studies discussed in this article reflect the widening diversity of labour responses 
at different workplaces, but also between labour struggles at factories and the 
established forms of labour politics at the national-level. Whether the observed labour 
unrest can provide the basis for a political-economic transformation in favour of the 
working class
60
 remains dependent on the capacity of these struggles to be mobilised 
beyond their individual experiences.  
Figure 1. Map of India and fieldwork sites 
 
Note: Map produced by Eseld Imms. 
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Table 1. Four cases of industrial restructuring and labour’s 
response 
Section City/ region 
Industry/ 
product 
Type of 
restructuring 
Labour's response 
2.1 
Kolkata/ 
NCR 
Electronic 
fan 
Technological 
change, 
outsourcing, 
informalisation of 
employment, 
intensification of 
the labour process 
and partial 
relocation of 
production 
Limited change to 
forms of collective 
bargaining 
institutions and 
labour 
organisations. 
2.2 
Mumbai/ 
Gujarat 
Luminaries 
Plant closure in 
Mumbai and 
relocation/ 
consolidation of 
production, 
informalisation of 
employment, and 
intensification of 
the labour process 
After a period of 
resistance, 
unionisation based 
on management 
controlled workers' 
committee. Limited 
role of the union 
from the closed site. 
 
Mumbai/ 
Khamgaon/ 
Dadra & 
Nagar Haveli 
Soap and 
detergent 
Plant closure in 
Mumbai and 
relocation. 
Outsourcing, 
informalisation of 
employment, and 
intensification of 
the labour process. 
Union federation's 
link maintained 
providing basis for 
extra-plant 
solidarity. 
2.3 NCR 
Automobile 
assembly 
New plan opened 
due to production 
expansion. 
Informalisation and 
intensification of 
the labour process. 
After intense (and 
on-going) struggle, 
contract workers-
based unionisation. 
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